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Abstract—Among access control models, Role-Based Access 
Control (RBAC) is very useful and is used in many computer 
systems. Static Combination of Duty (SCD) and Dynamic 
Combination of Duty (DCD) constraints have been 
introduced recently for this model to handle dependent roles. 
These roles must be used together and can be considered as a 
contrary point of conflicting roles. In this paper, we propose 
several new types of SCD and DCD constraints. Also, we 
introduce strong dependent roles and define new groups of 
SCD constraints for these types of roles as SCD with 
common items and SCD with union items. In addition, we 
present an extension for SCD constraints in the presence of 
hierarchy.  
Keywords- Role-Based Access Control (RBAC); 
Combination of Duty (CD); Static combination of Duty (SCD); 
Dynamic Combination of Duty (DCD); Dependent Roles. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model is accepted 
well for its numerous advantages such as policy neutrality 
and efficient access control management [1, 2, 3]. 
Furthermore, the concept of role is associated with the 
notion of functional role in an organization. Hence, RBAC 
models provide intuitive support for expressing 
organizational access control policies.  
RBAC has been introduced by Ferraiolo and Kuhn in 
1992 and then has been completed by Sandhu et al. in 
1996 [4, 3]. In 2001, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) provided a standard for RBAC model 
[1]. In this model, Static Separation of Duty (SSD) and 
Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSD) constraints have been 
defined. Also, SSD has been extended in the presence of 
hierarchy. SSD means that no user must be assigned to 
conflicting roles. DSD means that no user must activate 
conflicting roles within the session. 
Ahn and Sandhu proposed Role-based Separation of 
duty Language (RSL99) in the context of RBAC model 
and then extended this language to Role-based constraints 
Language (RCL 2000) [5, 6]. Their language can specify 
Separation of Duty (SD) constraints for conflicting 
permissions and conflicting users. 
Simon and Zurko classified completely SD constraints 
in the role-based environments [7]. They proposed object-
based SD (i.e. no user may act upon a target that the user 
has previously acted upon), operational SD (i.e. no user 
may assume a set of roles that have the capability for a 
complete business job), history-based SD (i.e. no user is 
allowed to perform all the actions in a business task in the 
same target or collection of targets). 
In [7], formal definitions of SD constraints are not 
provided. Gligor et al. formally defined these constraints 
and also presented them with more details [8]. For 
example, SSD constraint was defined in two forms of 
Strict SSD (SSSD) and one step SSSD (1sSSSD) [8]. 
SSSD means that conflicting roles are not permitted to 
perform more than one operation on objects. 1sSSSD 
means that each two distinct roles in a set of conflicting 
roles are not permitted to perform operations on the same 
object. 
SD constraints are an important topic in RBAC model 
and many researchers have investigated their aspects and 
issues. SD constraints force conflicting items such as roles, 
permissions and so on to be used separately. But, we 
should not focus only on conflicting items; because, there 
are dependent items in our environments, which must be 
used together. In [9], Hosseini and Azgomi introduced 
Combination of Duty (CD) constraints which handle 
dependent roles. They proposed Static Combination of 
Duty (SCD) and Dynamic Combination of Duty (DCD). 
SCD means that a user must be assigned to dependent 
roles. DCD means that a user must activate dependent 
roles.  
SCD and DCD constraints are not enough to support a 
wide range of dependent roles. Therefore, it is necessary to 
define more CD constraints. Also, CD constraints and 
dependent roles can be considered as a contrary point of 
SD constraints and conflicting roles, respectively. Hence, 
we can declare a new CD constraint corresponding to each 
SD constraint.  
In this paper, we propose completely the following CD 
constraints: 
• Two types of SCD, 
• SCD with common items, 
• SCD with union items, 
• SCD, SCD with common items and SCD with union, 
items in the presence of hierarchy, and 
• Five types of DCD. 
Two types of SCD constraints distribute dependent 
roles between a set of users. SCD with common items 
constraints are a strict version of SCD types. Here, 
common items must be assigned to dependent roles. SCD 
with union items constraints are an intermediate version 
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between SCD with common items and SCD constraints. In 
RBAC model, roles can inherit other roles. Therefore, we 
extend SCD constraints in this manner. Five types of DCD 
constraints distribute dependent roles between a set of 
sessions and a set of users. By using these new CD 
constraints, we can specify powerful, exact and flexible 
policies related to dependent roles.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section II, the RBAC model and its required detail are 
mentioned. In section III, new CD constraints are formally 
defined. Finally, we conclude the paper and mention some 
future works in Section IV. 
II. THE NIST RBAC MODEL 
In 2001, NIST provided a standard for RBAC model 
[1]. RBAC model is defined in terms of three components: 
core, hierarchy and constraint. Each component has some 
elements. Also, some functions are defined in NIST 
RBAC model.  
In RBAC model, core includes six elements, called 
USERS, ROLES, OBS, OPS, PRMS and SESSIONS, 
which are the sets of users, roles, objects, operations, 
permissions and sessions, respectively [1]. User is defined 
as a human being and role is a job function in an 
organization. Permission is an approval to perform an 
operation (such as read or write) on one or more objects. 
Users and permissions are assigned to roles. UA and UP 
are sets of user-role and permission-role assignments, 
respectively. PRMS, UA and PA can be formally defined 
as follows: 
PRMS= OBS OPS2 ×  (1) 
UA ⊆ USERS× ROLES (2) 
PA ⊆ PRMS× ROLES (3) 
We explain some required functions related to core as 
follows:  
• AssignedRoles function returns a set of roles assigned 
to the user.  
• RolePrms function returns a set of permissions 
assigned to the role.  
• RoleObs function returns a set of objects assigned as 
permissions to the role.  
• RoleOps function returns a set of operations assigned 
as permissions to the role.  
• RoleOpsOnOb function returns a set of operations 
which can perform on an object by the role.  
The above functions can be formally defined as 
follows: 
AssignedRoles(u)={r: ROLES | (u, r)∈UA} (4) 
RolePrms(r)={p: PRMS | (p, r)∈PA} (5) 
RoleObs(r)={ob: OBS| ∃ op∈OPS: ((op, ob), r)∈PA} (6) 
RoleOps(r)={op: OPS| ∃ ob∈OBS: ((op, ob), r)∈PA} (7) 
RoleOpsOnOb(r, ob)={op: OPS| ((op, ob), r)∈PA} (8) 
Each session is associated with a single user and each 
user is associated with one or more sessions. A user can 
activate a subset of roles assigned to him/her within a 
session. The following are some functions related to 
session:  
• UserSessions function returns a set of sessions 
associated with the user.  
• SessionUser function returns the user who is owner of 
the session.  
• SessionRoles function returns a set of roles activated 
within the session.  
• ActivatedRoles function returns a set of roles activated 
by the user.  
The above functions can be formally defined as 
follows: 
UserSessions(u) → 2SESSIONS (9) 
∀u1, u2∈USERS: UserSessions(u1)I UserSessions(u2)= ∅  
SessionUser(s)={u:USERS|UserSession(u)I {s}={s}} (10) 
SessionRoles(s) ⊆ AssignedRoles(SessionUser(s) (11) 
ActivatedRoles(u)= U
)ns(UserSessio
)es(SessionRol
us
s
∈
 
(12) 
A Role Hierarchy (RH) is a subset of 
ROLES× ROLES and defines a seniority relation between 
roles, whereby senior roles inherit permissions of their 
juniors, and junior roles inherit user membership of their 
seniors. This relation between roles r1 and r2 is denoted by 
r1 f r2 or (r1, r2)∈RH, whereby r1 and r1 are senior and 
junior roles, respectively.  
We use the term authorized to refer to both assigned 
and inherited. Now, we revise the hierarchal version of the 
above functions for core as follows: 
• AuthorizedRoles function returns a set of roles, which 
are authorized for the user.  
• RoleHPrms function returns a set of permissions, 
which are authorized for the role.  
• RoleHObs function returns a set of objects, which are 
authorized as permissions for the role.  
• RoleHOps function returns a set of operations, which 
are authorized as permissions for the role.  
• RoleHOpsOnHOb function returns a set of operations, 
which can be performed on an object by the role in the 
presence of hierarchy.  
The above functions can be formally defined as 
follows. In the following definitions, we have 
∀ r∈ROLES: (r, r)∈RH. 
AuthorizedRoles(u)= {r:ROLES| ∈′∃r ROLES: 
,(r ′ r)∈RH ∧  (u, ∈′)r UA} 
(13) 
RoleHPrms(r)= {p:PRMS| ∈′∃r ROLES: (14) 
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(r , ∈′)r RH ∧  (p, ∈′)r PA} 
RoleHObs(r)= {ob: OBS| ∈′∃r ROLES, op∈OPS: 
(r , ∈′)r RH ∧  ((op, ob), ∈′)r PA} 
(15) 
RoleHOps(r)= {op: OPS| ∈′∃r ROLES, ob∈OBS: 
(r , ∈′)r RH ∧  ((op, ob), ∈′)r PA} 
(16) 
RoleHOpsOnHOb(r, ob)={op: OPS| ∈′∃r ROLES: 
(r , ∈′)r RH ∧  ((op, ob), ∈′)r PA} 
(17) 
Constrained RBAC includes three types of SD 
constraints as SSD, SSD in the presence of hierarchy and 
DSD.  
Definition 1. Separation of Duty (SD) is defined as a 
pair (rs, rn), which rs is a set of conflicting roles and rn is a 
natural number greater than or equal to 2 and less than or 
equal to the cardinality of rs. 
Definition 2. Static Separation of Duty (SSD) is a 
subset of SD, such that each user must be assigned to less 
than rn conflicting roles. SSD is formally defined as 
follows, where N is a set of natural numbers: 
SSD ⊆ 2ROLES× N (18) 
∀ (rs, rn)∈SSD, u∈USERS: |AssignedRoles(u)I rs|<rn 
Definition 3. Static Separation of Duty in the presence 
of Hierarchy (SSDH) is a subset of SD, such that each user 
must be authorized for less than rn conflicting roles. SSDH 
is formally defined as follows: 
SSDH ⊆ 2ROLES× N (19) 
∀ (rs, rn)∈SSDH, u∈USERS: |AuthorizedRoles(u)I rs|<rn 
Definition 4. Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSD) is a 
subset of SD, such that less than rn conflicting roles must 
be activated within the session. DSD is formally defined as 
follows: 
DSD ⊆ 2ROLES× N (20) 
∀ (rs, rn)∈DSD,  s∈SESSIONS: |SessionRoles(s)I rs|<rn 
It is worth to mention that the above formal definitions 
differ from that appeared in [1] for NIST RBAC model, 
but they have the same meanings. The above definitions 
are given in order to be compatible with the new 
constraints we present in the next section. 
III. DEFINITIONS OF EXTENDED COMBINATION OF 
DUTY CONSTRAINTS 
In RBAC model and its extensions, which we 
introduced in section I, the conflicting roles have been 
investigated by numerous researchers. Hence, various SD 
constraints have been defined to handle them. Conflicting 
roles must be used separately. But we do not deal with 
only such roles. There is another group of roles, which are 
called dependent roles. These roles are as a contrary point 
of conflicting roles and must be used together. Because of 
dependency, if we assign them to distinct users, then we 
will waste much time to collaborate users. Therefore, using 
dependent roles separately is not desired and efficient and 
may be entirely impossible.  
The importance of dependent roles undergoes a rising 
trend, because the new methods and tools are generated 
continuously, which automate the works. Hence, the 
required time for doing tasks are decreased. Therefore, 
more roles can be assigned to one person while it was not 
possible in the past. Organizations are very interested in 
this topic, because they are looking for the ways to reduce 
their expenses for better competition. It is obvious that 
they prefer to assign dependent roles instead of 
independent roles to one user. Therefore, some policies 
appear which are based on dependent roles and we need 
various constraints for specifying these policies. However, 
there are not enough constraints that are related to 
dependent roles.  
In a previous paper [9], we introduced Combination of 
Duty (CD) constraints which handle dependent roles. CD 
is defined as a pair (rs, rn) which rs is a set of dependent 
roles and rn is a natural number greater than or equal to 1 
and less than the cardinality of rs. Also, we defined Static 
Combination of Duty (SCD) and Dynamic Combination of 
Duty (DCD). We repeat the formal definitions of these 
constraints in the subsections A and E. Also, we define 
other types of CD constraints in the following subsections. 
A. Various types of static combination of duty 
In this subsection, first we present the formal definition 
of SCD constraint as appeared in [9]. Then, we propose 
two other types of SCD constraints. We rename the 
original SCD as SCDtype I or shortly SCDI and call the new 
constraints as SCDII and SCDIII. 
Definition 5. Type I of Static Combination of Duty 
(SCDI) means that each user must be assigned to no or 
more than rn dependent roles. SCDI can be formally 
defined as follows: 
SCDI ⊆ 2ROLES× N (21) 
∀ (rs, rn)∈SCDI,  u∈USERS: 
|AssignedRoles(u)I rs|=0 ∨  |AssignedRoles(u)I rs|>rn 
Example 1. SCDI = {({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2)},   
AssignedRoles(u1)={r1, r2, r3},   AssignedRoles(u2)={r5}, 
AssignedRoles(u3)={r1} 
u1 can satisfy the constraint because u1 is assigned to more 
than two dependent roles. u2 can satisfy the constraint, 
because u2 is assigned to no dependent role. u3 cannot 
satisfy the constraint, because u3 is not assigned to enough 
dependent roles (i.e. more than two). 
As mentioned earlier, dependent roles must be used 
together. SCDI focuses dependency on each user. 
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Therefore, he/she must be assigned to more than rn 
dependent roles. We define other versions, which 
distribute dependency between a set of users. Therefore, 
this set instead of each user must be assigned to more than 
rn dependent roles. 
Definition 6. Type II of Static Combination of Duty 
(SCDII) means that the user u can be assigned to less than 
or equal to rn dependent roles if the following conditions 
are satisfied: 
• There is the set us of users assigned to less than or 
equal to rn dependent roles. 
• u and us are assigned to more than rn dependent roles. 
We explain the expression “less than or equal to rn” of 
the first condition that u and us must need together to 
satisfy the dependency relation. If us is assigned to more 
than rn dependent roles then u will not have any effect in 
this satisfaction. SCDII can be formally defined as follows: 
 
SCDII ⊆ 2ROLES× N (22) 
∀ (rs, rn)∈SCDII: 
∀ u∈USERS ,such that 0<|AssignedRoles(u)I rs| ≤ rn: 
∃ us ⊆ USERS: | IU ))les(AssignedRo(
usx
x
∈
rs| ≤ rn  ∧  
| I
U
U )
}{
)les(AssignedRo(
uusx
x
∈
rs|>rn 
Example 2. SCDII={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2)}, 
AssignedRoles(u1)={r1},  AssignedRoles(u2)={r2, r3}, 
AssignedRoles(u3)={r2},  AssignedRoles(u4)={r3}, 
AssignedRoles(u5)={r1, r2, r3}. 
u5 is assigned to more than two dependent roles. 
Hence, this user does not need other users to satisfy SCDII. 
u1 and u2 are not assigned to enough dependent roles. It is 
true because {u1, u2} is assigned to enough dependent 
roles. Also, u1, u3 and u4 are not assigned to enough 
dependent roles. It is true because {u1, u3, u4} is assigned 
to enough dependent roles. 
As observed, u1 is a common user of {u1, u2} and {u1, 
u3, u4}. Therefore, we define SCDIII that forces the sets to 
be distinct: 
Definition 7. Type III of Static Combination of Duty 
(SCDIII) means that the user u can be assigned to less than 
or equal to rn dependent roles if the following conditions 
are satisfied: 
• There is the set us of users assigned to less than or 
equal to rn dependent roles. 
• u and us are assigned to more than rn dependent roles. 
• u and us do not have this relation with other users. 
SCDIII can be formally defined as follows: 
SCDIII ⊆ 2ROLES× N (23) 
∀ (rs, rn)∈SCDIII: 
∃ us1, us2, …, usn ⊆ USERS: U
n
i
ius
1=
=USERS  ∧   ( ∀ usi, 
usj such that i ≠ j: usiI usj= ∅ )  ∧   ( ∀ usi: | U
iusx∈
Assigned(  
Roles(x))I rs|=0  ∨   ( IU
iusx
x
∈
))les(AssignedRo( rs|>rn  ∧  
( ∀ uss ⊂ usi such that |uss|=|usi|-1: | U
ussx∈
lesAssignedRo(  
(x))I rs| ≤ rn))) 
Example 3. SCDIII={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2)} 
Step 1: 
AssignedRoles(u1)={r1},  AssignedRoles(u2)={r2, r3}, 
AssignedRoles(u3)={r2},  AssignedRoles(u4)={r3}. 
us1={u1, u2} is assigned to more than two dependent 
roles and can satisfy SCDIII. Users of this set such as u1 
cannot cooperate with other users such as u3 and u4. 
Hence, we cannot consider us2={u1, u3, u4}. Also, {u3, u4} 
is not assigned to enough dependent roles. We have two 
ways to satisfy SCDIII. In the first way, u3 or u4 is assigned 
to r1 or r4 (i.e. AssignedRoles(u3)={r1, r2}). Therefore, 
us2={u3, u4} can satisfy SCDIII. In the second way, another 
user such u5 is assigned to r1 or r4 (i.e. AssignedRoles(u5) 
={r1}). Therefore, us2={u3, u4, u5} can satisfy SCDIII. 
Step 2: 
AssignedRoles(u1)={r1},  AssignedRoles(u2)={r2}, 
AssignedRoles(u3) ={r3, r4}. 
us1={u1, u2, u3} cannot satisfy SCDIII, because a subset 
of us1 such as {u2, u3} is assigned to more than rn 
dependent roles. Also, we cannot consider us1={u1, u3} 
and us2={u2, u3}, because these two sets have a common 
user (i.e. u3). If u3 is de-assigned from r4, then us1={u1, u2, 
u3} can satisfy SCDIII. 
B. Static Combination of Duty with common objects, 
operations and permissions 
In this subsection, we define new constraints as SCD 
with common items, which are strict versions of SCD 
types. These constraints force strong dependency between 
roles. Here, common items such as objects, operations and 
permissions must be assigned to dependent roles. We can 
define four kinds of these constraints for each type of SCD 
as follows: 
• SCD with common objects. 
• SCD with common operations. 
• SCD with common objects and operations. 
• SCD with common permissions. 
Common items are specified in two ways. In the first 
way, a set of common items is determined. We use obs, 
ops and prms, which are sets of common objects, 
operations and permissions, respectively. These sets 
cannot be empty and must have some members. In the 
second way, the number of common items is determined. 
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We use obn, opn and prmn, which are the number of 
common objects, operations and permissions, respectively. 
These parameters cannot be zero and must be a natural 
number. In the formal definitions, we use them as 
(obs||obn), (ops||opn) and (prms||prmn). The symbol “||” 
between two expressions means that only one of the two 
expressions must be considered. Also, we say that “||” may 
be used for more times in a definition or paragraph. For all 
“||”, only the left expressions or only the right expressions 
must be considered. 
We define SCDI with common items. Definitions of 
other types are similar to them. 
Definition 8. Type I of Static Combination of Duty 
with Common Object (SCDCOBI) means that each user 
must be assigned to no or more than rn dependent roles. 
Also, in the second state, the intersection of objects 
assigned as permissions to these roles must include the set 
obs or have more than or equal to obn members. SCDCOBI 
can be formally defined as follows: 
SCDCOBI ⊆ 2ROLES× N× (2OBS||N) (24) 
∀ (rs, rn, obs||obn)∈SCDCOBI,  u∈USERS: 
|rss|=0  ∨   (|rss|>rn  ∧   (obs ⊆ rssobs  ||  obn ≤ |rssobs|)) 
,such that  rss=AssignedRoles(u)I rs  ∧  
).
∈
RoleObs(I
rssr
rrssobs =  
Definition 9. Type I of Static Combination of Duty 
with Common Operations (SCDCOPI) means that each 
user must be assigned to no or more than rn dependent 
roles. Also, in the second state, the intersection of 
operations assigned as permissions to these roles must 
include the set ops or have more than or equal to opn 
members. SCDCOPI can be formally defined as follows: 
SCDCOPI ⊆ 2ROLES× N× (2OPS||N) (25) 
∀ (rs, rn, ops||opn)∈SCDCOPI,  u∈USERS: 
|rss|=0  ∨   (|rss|>rn  ∧   (ops ⊆ rssops  ||  opn ≤ |rssops|)) 
,such that  rss=AssignedRoles(u)I rs  ∧  
).
∈
RoleOps(I
rssr
rrssops =  
 We join SCDCOB and SCDCOP together to define a 
stricter version than them. In this version, common 
operations must perform on common objects. 
Definition 10. Type I of Static Combination of Duty 
with Common Objects
 
and Operations (SCDCOB-OPI) 
means that each user must be assigned to no or more than 
rn dependent roles. Also, in the second state, the 
intersection of objects assigned as permissions to these 
roles must include the set obs or have more than or equal 
to obn members. In addition, the intersection of operations, 
which can be performed on each common object by these 
roles must include the set ops or have more than or equal 
to opn members. SCDCOB-OPI can be formally defined as 
follows: 
SCDCOB-OPI ⊆ 2ROLES× N× (2OBS||N)× (2OPS||N) (26) 
∀ (rs, rn, obs||obn, ops||opn)∈SCDCOB-OPI, u∈USERS: 
|rss|=0  ∨   (|rss|>rn  ∧   (obs ⊆ rssobs  ||  obn ≤ |rssobs|)  ∧  
( ∀ ob∈obs: ops ⊆ rssopson(ob)  ||  opn ≤ |rssopson(ob)|)) 
,such that  rss=AssignedRoles(u)I rs  ∧  
)
∈
RoleObs(I
rssr
rrssobs =  ∧  
).) ,b(RoleOpsOnO)( I
rssr
obrobrssopson
∈
=  
SCDCOB-OP forces to perform all common operations 
on each common object. But it may be needed to perform 
some operations on object1, some operations on object2 
and so on. This demand can be fulfilled by SCD with 
common permissions. We mention that the permission is 
an approval to perform an operation on an object. 
Definition 11. Static Combination of Duty with 
Common Permissions (SCDCPRMSI) means that each 
user must be assigned to no or more than rn dependent 
roles. Also, in the second state, the intersection of 
permissions assigned to these roles must include the set 
prms or have more than or equal to prmn members. 
SCDCPRMSI can be formally defined as follows: 
SCDCPRMSI ⊆ 2ROLES× N× (2PRMS||N) (27) 
∀ (rs, rn, prms||prmn)∈SCDCPRMSI,  u∈USERS: 
|rss|=0 ∨  (|rss|>rn ∧  (prms ⊆ rssprms || prmn ≤ |rssprms|)) 
,such that  rss=AssignedRoles(u)I rs  ∧  
).
∈
RolePrms(I
rssr
rrssprms =  
Example 4. There are the following specifications. 
RolePrms(r1)={(ob1, op1), (ob1, op2), (ob2, op1), (ob2, op2)} 
RolePrms(r2)={(ob1, op1), (ob1, op2), (ob2, op1), (ob2, op2),   
(ob3,op3)}, 
RolePrms(r3)={(ob1, op1), (ob3, op3)}, 
RolePrms(r4)={(ob1, op1), (ob2, op2), (ob4, op4)}, 
RolePrms(r5)={(ob3, op3), (ob4, op4)}, 
RolePrms(r6)={(ob1, op1), (ob1, op2), (ob1, op3) (ob2, op1),  
(ob2, op2), (ob2, op3)}, 
As a result, we have: 
RoleObs(r1)={ob1, ob2}, RoleObs(r2)={ob1, ob2, ob3}, 
RoleObs(r3)={ob1, ob3}, RoleObs(r4)={ob1, ob2, ob4}, 
RoleObs(r5)={ob3, ob4}, RoleObs(r6)={ob1, ob2}, 
RoleOps(r1)={op1, op2}, RoleOps(r2)={op1, op2, op3}, 
RoleOps(r3)={op1, op3}, RoleOps(r4)={op1, op2, op4}, 
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RoleOps(r5)={op3, op4}, RoleOps(r6)={op1, op2, op3}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r1, ob1)={op1, op2}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r1, ob2)={op1, op2}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r2, ob1)={op1, op2}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r2, ob2)={op1, op2}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r2, ob3)={op3}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r3, ob1)={op1}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r3, ob3)={op3}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r4, ob1)={op1}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r4, ob2)={op2}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r4, ob4)={op4}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r5, ob3)={op3}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r5, ob4)={op4}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r6, ob1)={op1, op2, op3}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r6, ob2)={op1, op2, op3}. 
Step 1: SCDCOBI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2, {ob1, ob2})}. 
AssignedRoles(u1)={r1, r2, r3} cannot satisfy the 
constraint, because the intersection of objects assigned to 
these roles (i.e. {ob1}) does not include obs (i.e. obs={ob1, 
ob2}). 
AssignedRoles(u2)={r1, r2, r4} can satisfy the constraint, 
because the intersection of objects assigned to these roles 
(i.e. {ob1, ob2}) includes obs. 
Step 2: SCDCOBI={({r1, r3, r5}, 1, 1)}. 
AssignedRoles(u3)={r1, r3} can satisfy the constraint, 
because the intersection of objects assigned to these roles 
(i.e. {ob1}) has obn  member (i.e. obn=1). 
AssignedRoles(u4)={r3, r5} can satisfy the constraint, 
because the intersection of objects assigned to these roles 
(i.e. {ob3}) has obn member. 
Step 3: SCDCOPI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2, {op1, op2})}. 
AssignedRoles(u1)={r1, r2, r3} cannot satisfy the 
constraint, because the intersection of operations assigned 
to these roles (i.e. {op1}) does not include ops (i.e. 
ops={op1, op2}). 
AssignedRoles(u2)={r1, r2, r4} can satisfy the constraint, 
because the intersection of operations assigned to these 
roles (i.e. {op1, op2}) includes ops. 
Step 4: SCDCOB-OPI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2, {ob1, ob2}, 
{op1, op2})}. 
AssignedRoles(u2)={r1, r2, r4} cannot satisfy the 
constraint, because although the intersection of objects 
assigned to these roles (i.e. {ob1, ob2}) includes obs (i.e. 
obs={ob1, ob2}), but the intersection of operations which 
can be performed on each common object by these roles 
(i.e. {op1} on ob1 and {op2} on ob2) does not include ops 
(i.e. ops={op1, op2}). 
AssignedRoles(u5)={r1, r2, r6} can satisfy the constraint, 
because the intersection of objects assigned to these roles 
(i.e. {ob1, ob2}) includes obs. Also, the intersection of 
operations, which can be performed on each common 
object by these roles (i.e. {op1, op2} on ob1 and {op1, op2} 
on ob2) includes ops. 
Step 5: SCDCPRMSI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2, {(ob1, op1), (ob2, 
op2)})}. 
AssignedRoles(u2)={r1, r2, r4} can satisfy the constraint, 
because the intersection of permissions assigned to these 
roles (i.e. {(ob1, op1), (ob2, op2)}) includes prms (i.e. prms 
={(ob1, op1), (ob2, op2)}). 
C. Static Combination of Duty with union objects, 
operations and permissions 
SCD with common items constraints focus on each 
dependent role and force common items to be assigned to 
it. In this subsection, we define new constraints as SCD 
with union items, which focus on a set of dependent roles 
and forces the items to be assigned to this set. These 
constraints can be considered as an intermediate version 
between SCD with common items and SCD constraints. 
Similar to SCD with common items, there are four kinds 
of SCD with union items constraints for each type of SCD 
as follows: 
• SCD with union objects. 
• SCD with union operations. 
• SCD with union objects and operations. 
• SCD with union permissions. 
We define SCDI with union objects and operations. 
Definitions of other kinds and types are similar to it. 
Definition 12. Type I of Static Combination of Duty 
with Union Objects and Operations (SCDUOB-OPI) 
means that each user must be assigned to no or more than 
rn dependent roles. Also, in the second state, union of 
objects assigned as permissions to these roles must include 
the set obs or have more than or equal to obn members. In 
addition, union of operations, which can be performed on 
each union object by these roles must include the set ops 
or have more than or equal to opn members. SCDUOB-OPI 
can be formally defined as follows: 
SCDUOB-OPI ⊆ 2ROLES× N× (2OBS||N)× ( 2OPS||N) (28) 
∀ (rs, rn, obs||obn, ops||opn)∈SCDUOB-OPI, u∈USERS: 
|rss|=0  ∨   (|rss|>rn  ∧   (obs ⊆ rssobs  ||  obn ≤ |rssobs|)  ∧  
( ∀ ob∈obs: ops ⊆ rssopson(ob)  ||  opn ≤ |rssopson(ob)|)) 
,such that  rss=AssignedRoles(u)I rs  ∧  
U
rssr
rrssobs
∈
)RoleObs(=   ∧  
).) ,b(RoleOpsOnO)( U
rssr
obrobrssopson
∈
=  
Example 5: There are the following specifications. 
RolePrms(r1)={(ob1, op1), (ob2, op1)}, 
RolePrms(r2)={(ob1, op2)}, RolePrms(r3)={(ob3, op4)}, 
RolePrms(r4)={(ob1, op3), (ob2, op2)}, 
As a result, we have: 
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RoleObs(r1)={ob1, ob2}, RoleObs(r2)={ob1}, 
RoleObs(r3)={ob3}, RoleObs(r4)={ob1, ob2}, 
RoleOps(r1)={op1}, RoleOps(r2)={op2}, 
RoleOps(r3)={op4}, RoleOps(r4)={op2, op3}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r1, ob1)={op1}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r1, ob2)={op1}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r2, ob1)={op2}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r3, ob3)={op4}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r4, ob1)={op3}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r4, ob2)={op2}. 
Step 1: SCDUOBI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2, {ob1, ob2})}. 
AssignedRoles(u1)={r1, r2, r3} can satisfy the constraint, 
because the union of objects assigned to these roles (i.e. 
{ob1, ob2, ob3}) includes obs (i.e. obs={ob1, ob2}). 
Step 2: SCDUOPI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2, {op1, op2})},  
AssignedRoles(u1)={r1, r2, r3} can satisfy the constraint, 
because the union of operations assigned to these roles (i.e. 
{op1, op2, op4}) includes ops (i.e. ops={op1, op2}). 
Step 3: SCDUOB-OPI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2, {ob1, ob2}, 
{op1, op2})}. 
AssignedRoles(u2)={r1, r2, r3} cannot satisfy the 
constraint, because although the union of objects assigned 
to these roles (i.e. {ob1, ob2, ob3}) includes obs (i.e. 
obs={ob1, ob2}) but the union of operations which can 
perform on each union object by these roles (i.e. {op1, op2} 
on ob1 and {op1} on ob2) does not include ops (i.e. 
ops={op1, op2}). 
AssignedRoles(u5)={r1, r2, r4} can satisfy the constraint, 
because the union of objects assigned to these roles (i.e. 
{ob1, ob2}) includes obs. Also, the union of operations 
which can perform on each union object by these roles (i.e. 
{op1, op2, op3} on ob1 and {op1, op2} on ob2) includes ops. 
Step 4: SCDUPRMSI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2, {(ob1, op1), (ob2, 
op2)})}. 
AssignedRoles(u2)={r1, r2, r3} cannot satisfy the 
constraint, because the union of permissions assigned to 
these roles (i.e. {(ob1, op1), (ob1, op2), (ob2, op1), (ob3, 
op4)}) does not include prms (i.e. prms={(ob1, op1), (ob2, 
op2)}). 
AssignedRoles(u2)={r1, r2, r4} can satisfy the constraint, 
because the union of permissions assigned to these roles 
(i.e. {(ob1, op1), (ob1, op2), (ob1, op3), (ob2, op1), (ob2, 
op2)}) includes prms. 
D. Static Combination of Duty in the presence of 
hierarchy 
In this subsection, we revise the previous constraints in 
the presence of hierarchy, which we already explained in 
section II. We define hierarchal versions of SCDI, SCDII, 
SCDCOB-OPI and SCDUOB-OPI. Definitions of the other 
constraints are similar to them. 
Definition 13. Type I of Static Combination of Duty in 
the presence of Hierarchy (SCDHI) means that each user 
must be authorized for no or more than rn dependent roles. 
SCDHI can be formally defined as follows: 
SCDHI ⊆ 2ROLES× N (29) 
∀ (rn, n)∈SCDHI,  u∈USERS: 
|AuthorizedRoles(u)I rs|=0  ∨   |AuthorizedRoles(u)I rs|>rn 
Definition 14. Type II of Static Combination of Duty 
in the presence of Hierarchy (SCDHII) means that the user 
u can be authorized for less than or equal to rn dependent 
roles if the following conditions are satisfied. 
• There is the set us of users authorized for less than or 
equal to rn dependent roles. 
• u and us are authorized for more than rn dependent 
roles. 
SCDHII can be formally defined as follows: 
SCDHII ⊆ 2ROLES × N (30) 
∀ (rs, rn)∈SCDHII: 
∀ u∈USERS ,such that 0<|AuthorizedRoles(u)I rs| ≤ rn: 
∃ us ⊆ USERS: | IU
usx
x
∈
))Roles(Authorized( rs| ≤ rn  ∧  
| I
U
U
}{
))Roles(Authorized(
uusx
x
∈
rs|>rn 
Definition 15. Type I of Static Combination of Duty in 
the presence of Hierarchy with Common Objects
 
and 
Operations (SCDHCOB-OPI) means that each user must 
be authorized for no or more than rn dependent roles. Also, 
in the second state, the intersection of objects authorized as 
permissions for these roles must include the set obs or 
have more than or equal to obn members. In addition, the 
intersection of operations which can be performed on each 
object by these roles in the presence of hierarchy must 
include the set ops or have more than or equal to opn 
members. SCDHCOB-OPI can be formally defined as 
follows: 
SCDHCOB-OPI ⊆ 2ROLES× N× (2OBS||N)× (2OPS||N) (31) 
∀ (rs, rn, obs||obn, ops||opn)∈SCDHCOB-OPI, u∈USERS: 
|rss|=0  ∨   (|rss|>rn  ∧  (obs ⊆ rsshobs || obn ≤ |rsshobs|) ∧  
( ∀ ob∈obs: ops ⊆ rsshopsonh(ob)  ||  opn ≤ |rsshopsonh(ob)|)) 
,such that  rss=AuthorizedRoles(u)I rs  ∧  
)
∈
RoleHObs(I
rssr
rrsshobs =  ∧  
).) ,HOb(RoleHOpsOn)( I
rssr
obrobrsshopsonh
∈
=  
Definition 16. Type I of Static Combination of Duty in 
the presence of Hierarchy with Union Objects and 
Operations (SCDHUOB-OPI) means that each user must 
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be authorized for no or more than rn dependent roles. Also, 
in the second state, the union of objects authorized as 
permissions for these roles must include the set obs or 
have more than or equal to obn members. In addition, the 
union of operations which can be performed on each 
object by these roles in the presence of hierarchy must 
include the set ops or have more than or equal to opn 
members. SCDHUOB-OPI can be formally defined as 
follows: 
SCDHUOB-OPI ⊆ 2ROLES× N× (2OBS||N)× ( 2OPS||N) (32) 
∀ (rs, rn, obs||obn, ops||opn)∈SCDHUOB-OPI, u∈USERS: 
|rss|=0  ∨   (|rss|>rn ∧  (obs ⊆ rsshobs || obn ≤ |rsshobs|)  ∧  
( ∀ ob∈obs: ops ⊆ rsshopsonhob  ||  opn ≤ |rsshopsonh(ob)|)) 
,such that  rss=AuthorizedRoles(u)I rs  ∧  
U
rssr
rrsshobs
∈
= )RoleHObs(   ∧  
).) ,HOb(RoleHOpsOn)( U
rssr
obrobrsshopsonh
∈
=  
Example 6. There are following specifications. 
RH={(r3, r2)}. 
RolePrms(r1)={(ob1, op1), (ob2, op1)}, 
RolePrms(r2)={(ob1, op1), (ob2, op2)}, 
RolePrms(r3)={(ob1, op4)}, RolePrms(r4)={(ob1, op2)}. 
As a result, we have:  
RoleObs(r1)={ob1, ob2}, RoleObs(r2)={ob1, ob2}, 
RoleObs(r3)={ob1}, RoleObs(r4)={ob1}, 
RoleHObs(r3)={ob1, ob2}, 
RoleOps(r1)={op1}, RoleOps(r2)={op1, op2}, 
RoleOps(r3)={op4}, RoleOps(r4)={op2}, 
RoleHOps(r3)={op1, op2, op4}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r1, ob1)={op1}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r1, ob2)={op1}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r2, ob1)={op1}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r2, ob2)={op2}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r3, ob1)={op4}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r3, ob2)={}, 
RoleOpsOnOb(r4, ob1)={op2}, 
RoleHOpsOnHOb(r3, ob1)={op1, op4}, 
RoleHOpsOnHOb(r3, ob2)={op2}. 
The hierarchal versions of functions are equal to 
original functions for roles, which are not senior of other 
roles such as r1, r2 and r4. For example,  
RoleHObs(r1)=RoleObs(r1) and  
RoleHOpsOnHOb(r1)=RoleObsOnOb(r1). 
Step 1:  
Part 1: SCDI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2)}. 
AssignedRoles(u1)={r1, r3} cannot satisfy the constraint, 
because this user is not assigned to enough dependent roles 
(i.e. more than 2). 
Part 2: SCDHI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2)}. 
AssignedRoles(u1)={r1, r3} can satisfy the constraint, 
because this user is authorized for more than two 
dependent roles (i.e. {r1, r2, r3}). 
Step 2:  
Part 1: SCDCOBI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2, {ob1, ob2})}. 
AssignedRoles(u1)={r1, r3} cannot satisfy the constraint, 
because this user is not assigned to enough dependent 
roles. Also, the intersection of objects assigned to these 
roles (i.e. {ob1}) does not include obs (i.e. obs={ob1, 
ob2}). 
Part 2: SCDHCOBI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2, {ob1, ob2})}. 
AssignedRoles(u1)={r1, r3} can satisfy the constraint, 
because this user is authorized for more than two 
dependent roles and the intersection of objects authorized 
for these roles (i.e. {ob1, ob2}) includes obs. 
Step 3:  
Part 1: SCDUOB-OPI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2, {ob1, ob2}, 
{op1, op2})}. 
AssignedRoles(u2)={r1, r3, r4} cannot satisfy the 
constraint, because the union of operations which can be 
performed on each object by these roles (i.e. {op1, op2, 
op4} on ob1 and {op1} on ob2) does not include ops (i.e. 
ops={op1, op2}). 
Part 2: SCDHUOB-OPI={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2, {ob1, ob2}, 
{op1, op2})}. 
AssignedRoles(u2)={r1, r3, r4} can satisfy the constraint, 
because the union of objects assigned to these roles (i.e. 
{ob1, ob2}) includes obs (i.e. obs={ob1, ob2}) and the 
union of the operations, which can be performed on each 
object by these roles in the presence of hierarchy (i.e. {op1, 
op2, op4} on ob1 and {op1, op2} on ob2) includes ops. 
E. Various types of dynamic combination of duty 
In this subsection, first we present the formal definition 
of DCD constraint which was already defined in [9]. This 
constraint is in the base of each session. Therefore, we 
rename it as DCDS-type I or shortly DCDS-I. We define 
another version which is based on each user. This version 
is called as DCDU-I. Then, we propose two other types of 
each constraint as DCDS-II, DCDS-III, DCDU-II and DCDU-III. 
Definition 17. Type S-I of Dynamic Combination of 
Duty (DCDS-I) means that no or more than rn dependent 
roles must be activated within the session. DCDS-I can be 
formally defined as follows: 
DCDS-I ⊆ 2ROLES× N (33) 
∀ (rs, rn) ∈DCDS-I,  s∈SESSIONS: 
|SessionRoles(s)I rs|=0  ∨   |SessionRoles(s)I rs|>rn 
Example 7. DCDS-I={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2)}. 
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SessionRoles(s1)={r1, r2, r3},  SessionRoles(s2)={r5}, 
SessionRoles(s3)={r1}. 
s1 can satisfy the constraint, because more than two 
dependent roles are activated within it. s2 can satisfy the 
constraint, because none of the dependent roles are 
activated within it. s3 cannot satisfy the constraint, because 
enough dependent roles are not activated within it (i.e. 
more than two). 
Definition 18. Type U-I of Dynamic Combination of 
Duty (DCDU-I) means that no or more than rn dependent 
roles must be activated by the user. DCDU-I can be 
formally defined as follows: 
DCDU-I ⊆ 2ROLES× N (34) 
∀ (rs, rn)∈DCDU-I,  u∈USERS: 
|ActivatedRoles(u)I rs|=0 ∨  |ActivatedRoles(u)I rs|>rn 
Example 8. DCDU-I={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2)}, 
UserSessions(u1)={s1, s2, s3, s4}. 
SessionRoles(s1)={r1},  SessionRoles(s2)={r2}, 
SessionRoles(s3)={},  SessionRoles(s4)={r2, r3}. 
As a result, we have:  
ActivatedRoles(u1)={r1, r2, r3}. 
Enough dependent roles are not activated within each 
session of u1. But, enough dependent roles are activated by 
u1. Therefore, DCDU-I is satisfied. As observed, DCDU-I 
distribute dependency between the sessions of each user. 
DCDS-I and DCDU-I focus dependency on each session 
and user, respectively. Hence, more than rn dependent 
roles must be activated within/by each session/user. We 
define other versions which distribute dependency between 
a set of sessions and a set of users, respectively. Therefore, 
more than rn dependent roles must be activated within/by 
these sets instead of each session and user. 
Definition 19. Type S-II of Dynamic Combination of 
Duty (DCDS-II) means that less than or equal to rn 
dependent roles can be activated within the session s if 
following conditions are satisfied. 
• There is the set ss of sessions that less than or equal to 
rn dependent roles are activated within it. 
• More than rn dependent roles are activated within s 
and ss. 
SCDS-II can be formally defined as follows: 
DCDS-II ⊆ 2ROLES× N (35) 
∀ (rs, rn)∈DCDS-II: 
∀ s∈SESSIONS ,such that 0<|SessionRoles(s)I rs| ≤ rn: 
∃ ss ⊆ SESSIONS: | IU ))es(SessionRol(
ssx
x
∈
rs| ≤ rn  ∧  
| I
U
U
}{
))es(SessionRol(
sssx
x
∈
rs|>rn 
Example 9. DCDS-II={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2)}, 
UserSessions(u1)={s1, s2, s3, s4}, UserSessions(u2)={s5, s6}, 
UserSessions(u3)={s7, s8, s9}, 
AssignedRoles(s1)={r1},  AssignedRoles(s5)={r2, r3}, 
AssignedRoles(s2)={r2},  AssignedRoles(s9)={r3}, 
AssignedRoles(s7)={r1, r2, r3}. 
More than two dependent roles are activated with s7. 
Hence, this session does not need other sessions to satisfy 
DCDS-II. Enough dependent roles are not activated within 
s1 and s5. It is true, because enough dependent roles are 
activated within {s1, s5}. Also, enough dependent roles are 
not activated within s1, s2 and s9. It is true, because enough 
dependent roles are activated within {s1, s2, s9}. 
Definition 20. Type U-II of Dynamic Combination of 
Duty (DCDU-II) means that the user u can activate less than 
or equal to rn dependent roles if the following conditions 
are satisfied. 
• There is the set us of users which activates less than or 
equal to rn dependent roles. 
• u and us activate more than rn dependent roles. 
DCDU-II can be formally defined as follows: 
DCDU-II ⊆ 2ROLES× N (36) 
∀ (rs, rn)∈DCDU-II: 
∀ u∈USERS ,such that 0<|ActivatedRoles(u)I rs| ≤ rn: 
∃ us ⊆ USERS: | IU
usx
x
∈
))oles(ActivatedR( rs| ≤ rn  ∧  
| I
U
U )
}{
)oles(ActivatedR(
uusx
x
∈
rs|>rn 
Example 10. DCDU-II={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2)}, 
ActivatedRoles(u1)={r1, r2},  ActivatedRoles(u2)={r2, r3}, 
ActivatedRoles(u3)={r1, r2, r3},  ActivatedRoles(u4)={r3}. 
u3 activates more than two dependent roles. Hence, this 
user does not need other users to satisfy DCDU-II. u1 and u2 
do not activate enough dependent roles. It is true, because 
{u1, u2} activates enough dependent roles. Also, u1 and u4 
do not activate enough dependent roles. It is true, because 
{u1, u4} activates enough dependent roles.  
As showed in example 9, s1 is a common session of 
{s1, s5} and {s1, s2, s9}. Also, in example 10, u1 is a 
common user of {u1, u2} and {u1, u4}. Therefore, we 
define DCDS-III and DCDU-III which force the sets to be 
distinct. 
Definition 21. Type S-III of Dynamic Combination of 
Duty (DCDS-III) means that less than or equal to rn 
dependent roles can be activated within the session s if the 
following conditions are true. 
• There is the set ss of sessions that less than or equal to 
rn dependent roles are activated within it. 
• More than rn dependent roles are activated within s 
and ss. 
• s and ss do not have this relation with other sessions. 
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DCDS-III can be formally defined as follows: 
DCDS-III ⊆ 2ROLES× N (37) 
∀ (rs, rn)∈DCDS-III: 
∃ ss1, ss2, …, ssn ⊆ SESSIONS: U
n
i
iss
1=
=SESSIONS  ∧  
( ∀ usi, usj such that i ≠ j: usiI usj= ∅ )  ∧  
( ∀ ssi: | U I
issx
x
∈
))es(SessionRol( rs|=0  ∨   ( U
issx∈
Session(  
Role(x))I rs|>rn  ∧    ( ∀ sss ⊂ usi such that |sss|=|ssi|-1: 
| U I
sssx
x
∈
))es(SessionRol( rs| ≤ rn))) 
Example 11. DCDS-III={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2)}, 
AssignedRoles(s1)={r1},  AssignedRoles(s5)={r2, r3}, 
AssignedRoles(s2)={r2},  AssignedRoles(s9)={r3}, 
AssignedRoles(s3)={r1}. 
ss1={s1, s5},  ss2={s2, s3, s9}. 
ss1 and ss2 do not have common members. Also, more than 
two dependent roles are activated within them. Therefore, 
they can satisfy DCDS-III. 
Definition 22. Type U-III of Dynamic Combination of 
Duty (DCDU-III) means that the user u can activate less 
than or equal to rn dependent roles if following conditions 
are satisfied. 
• There is the set us of users which activates less than or 
equal to rn dependent roles. 
• u and us activate more than rn dependent roles. 
• u and us do not have this relation with other users. 
DCDU-III can be formally defined as follows: 
DCDU-III ⊆ 2ROLES× N (38) 
∀ (rs, rn)∈DCDU-III: 
∃ us1, us2, …, usn ⊆ USERS: U
n
i
ius
1=
=USERS  ∧   ( ∀ usi, 
usj such that i ≠ j: usiI usj= ∅ )  ∧   ( ∀ usi: | U
iusx∈
Activated(  
Roles(x))I rs|=0  ∨   ( IU
iusx
x
∈
))oles(ActivatedR( rs|>rn  ∧  
( ∀ uss ⊂ usi such that |uss|=|usi|-1: | U
ussx∈
olesActivatedR  
(x))I rs| ≤ rn))) 
Example 12. DCDU-III={({r1, r2, r3, r4}, 2)}, 
ActivatedRoles(u1)={r1, r2},  ActivatedRoles(u2)={r2, r3}, 
ActivatedRoles(u3)={r1, r2},  ActivatedRoles(u4)={r3}. 
us1={u1, u2},  us2={u3, u4}. 
us1 and us2 do not have common members. Also, they 
activate more than two dependent roles. Therefore, they 
can satisfy DCDU-III. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we proposed various types of 
combination of duty constraints for handling different 
aspects of dependent roles. Type I of SCD and DCD focus 
dependency on each user and session. Type II and III of 
SCD and DCD constraints distribute dependency between 
a set of users and a set of sessions. SCD with common 
items and SCD with union items are strict versions of 
SCD. The former forces common items to be assigned to 
each dependent role and the latter forces union items to be 
assigned to a set of dependent roles. Hierarchal version of 
SCD constraints considers seniority relation between roles 
as well as dependency relation. Also, we explain that the 
usage of dependent roles undergoes a rising trend. We 
want to do more research about dependent roles in the 
future works.   
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